Om Somalia, information från andra sidan

Via en konservativ kompis fick jag tag på några artiklar som beskriver Somalia, och som jag fick förstå gav en mer kritisk syn på landet (än vad bl.a. Peter Leesons Better off Stateless ger, troligtvis). Dessa artiklar - Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State (2002), Somalia: From Resilience Towards Recovery and Development (2006), Somalia: A Nation Without a State (2007) - kommer med intressant information om landet som, om det stämmer, borde göra en mindre skeptisk till anarki.

Anarki, men ändå fungerande ekonomi
Många industrier förstördes under inbördeskriget i början av 90-talet, men efter att striderna ebbade ut (och även samtidigt!) kunde entreprenörer, befriade från statens regleringar, våga sig på nya investeringar som, även om de är småskaliga, lett till ökat välstånd i ekonomin.

The private sector has demonstrated its capacity to adapt quickly to unexpected market developments; for in stance, when the Saudis placed a ban on livestock, the private sector shifted shipments to other Gulf countries. Unlike in the pre-war years, absent or weak administrative structures provide minimal interference with trade or private sector activities. As a consequence, the private sector has flourished, trading with neighboring and Asian countries, processing agricultural products, manufacturing o n a small scale, and providing services previously dominated by the public sector. Since the mid-1990s, moreover, civil society - with many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) headed by women - has taken an increasingly important role in the supervision and delivery of public goods and services.

- From Resilience, s. 9

The private sector also quickly took the place of the state in the provision of many goods and services, including basic infrastructure. Sometimes it did so better and more efficiently than the state before the civil war, as in telecommunications - an international phone air transport-call costs 50 cents per minute, the cheapest rate anywhere in Africa - and Daallo Airlines flies Paris-Djibouti for 40 percent of the price of Air France. Sometimes it did so less reliably and efficiently, as for electricity, water, and sanitation - but service is now available in towns that never benefited from those services in the prior autocratic regime. And sometimes, as in the case of banking services beyond money transfers, it did so only to a minimal extent. The private sector also offers essential social services, coverage of which in some cases extends beyond peak levels achieved under the previous autocratic regime. Even in court services-dispute resolution, contract enforcement, property rights protection, and law and order - private solutions relying on traditional clan customs have been viable so far. As growth introduces outside players into the economy, however, regulation inevitably will have to increase.

- From Resilience, s. 69

Since 1998 the success o f the telecom companies and of many returned migrants encouraged acceleration in the development o f small-scale manufacturing enterprises. In most cases, however, the maximum investment was below US$0.2 million and often much less - resulting in limitations of scale. Nonetheless, by May 2002 there were about 25 functioning industrial plants in Mogadishu, mostly in its southern section, evidence that security conditions in the capital may be bad for foreigners but acceptable to Somali investors. These plants are producing pasta, mineral water, sweets, plastic bags and sheets, hides and skins, detergent and soap, aluminum, foam mattresses and pillows, fishing boats, packaging, and stone processing. Most sourced their equipments and recurrent inputs from Asian countries, which provide cost-effective quality equipment, industrial materials, and training opportunities for engineers and technicians, as well as easy visas. More recently, the Coca-Cola bottling plant represents a significant investment of almost US$5 million. There have also been industrial investments in the last decade in the northern regions, but neither Hargeysa nor Bosasso is close to reaching the level of manufacturing activity in Mogadishu.

- From Resilience, s. 76

Som noterades ovan innebär inte anarki/polycentri att det inte finns någon lag och ordning, utan att den produceras privat.

Since the last UN peacekeeping forces pulled out in early 1995, Somalia has been largely forgotten – relegated to being one of the world’s chief examples of a “failed state” – and assumed to be a land of lawlessness and chronic, criminally opportunistic, conflict. But while there is no functioning, recognised central government, that does not mean Somalia is nowhere governed. Local structures operate in some parts of the country; militias or unrecognised administrations have established themselves in others, and elsewhere Somalis live relatively peaceful lives without benefit of state structures.

- Countering Terrorism, s. 6 (min kursivering)

Samma rapport hävdar att ekonomin, generellt sätt förbättrades:

The influence of Islamist groups aside, by 1999, political and economic trends in Somalia appeared promising. Parts of the country were recovering economically and generating significant commercial opportunities. Transit trade, remittances and livestock exports were strong, and improved security and rule of law in many areas encouraged domestic investments in fixed asset businesses such as pasta and bottled water factories and triggered a boom in new home construction.

- Countering Terrorism, s. 10

Osäkerhet delvis tack vare utomstående statlig aktivitet
Artikeln säger dock att efter 1999 har läget förvärrats, av oklara anledningar, men det kan ha att göra med att en ny exil-stat försökte implementeras, vilket inte uppskattades av så många klaner; av de större klanerna var bara en enad i att stötta staten, de andra var fientliga eller delade. Den nya och, visade det sig, kortlivade staten verkar inte ha gjort så mycket bra för landet:

Indeed, the Transitional National Government controls only half of Mogadishu and a few areas in the interior. Even in Mogadishu most day-to-day governance is at the neighbourhood level by informal systems of policing and clan-based sharia courts. Establishment of the Transitional National Government did not improve security in the capital. Instead, banditry worsened and armed clashes increased throughout the South. The security on main commercial arteries that Mogadishu businessmen achieved through the sharia court militia in 1999 has largely been lost. The capital’s main seaport and airport remain closed.

The Transitional National Government runs the risk of becoming irrelevant and losing its remaining credibility. It faces a crisis of legitimacy even among its own supporters because of infighting, corruption, and the scandal of its business backers’ involvement with counterfeit shillings that have sparked hyperinflation.

- Countering Terrorism, s. 11

Men det finns andra faktorer som ökat våldet, bl.a. att i tidiga 00-talet var det osäkert i Puntland efter att den uttalade ledaren över området försökte utöka sin makt, vilket möttes av motstånd. En annan källa till oro var att Arabstaterna i närheten då införde ett förbud mot import av somaliska nötkött, p.g.a. rädsla för sjukdomar. (Detta visade sig dock vara ett överkomligt problem, som Världsbankens rapport ova visar. Detta påminner att risker för utveckling inte nödvändigtvis behöver inträffa.) En annan källa till oro var USA:s febrila "krig" mot "terrorism":

American planning for possible anti-terrorist actions in Somalia has also increased political tensions. Accusations that the Transitional National Government is a front for radical Islamists have led to concerns about American attacks and heightened tensions between that authority and the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council. Ethiopia has been funnelling arms and money to the latter, raising the possibility of renewed fighting on a much larger scale than the region has seen in a decade. ...

Finally, the U.S. government’s move in October 2001 to freeze the assets of the leading Somali money transfer and telecom company, al-Barakaat, on grounds that it was a conduit for al-Qaeda financial transactions, has slowed the flow of remittances and damaged business confidence. Collectively, these factors have spawned Somalia’s worst economic crisis in many years, and UN agencies are warning of a potential large-scale humanitarian crisis.

- Countering Terrorism, s. 12/13

Ett annat problem är att det finns en konflikt mellan, något förenklat, Arabstaterna och Ethiopien om vad som bör göras i Somalia. De förra vill ha en stark stat där, medan Ethiopien vill ha en svag eller ingen alls.

Även under det tidiga inbördeskriget har utomstående stater förvärrat situationen i Somalia, och det verkar även som att de bidragit till att hålla konflikten vid liv, då det visar sig att många krigsgrupper levde på deras stöd.

Political affiliation along factional lines has greatly diminished since the mid-1990s; most factions are virtually defunct, and political identity and representation now centres more explicitly on clan lines. Ironically, the withdrawal of the international community may have played a part in reducing the power of the faction and militia leaders. In the past, large aid flows provided warlords with funds, and international mediation efforts gave them political legitimacy. In the absence of external recognition and resources, warlords have seen their influence dim, including Hussein Aidid and General Morgan, who are now totally dependent on Ethiopia.

- Countering Terrorism, s. 9-10 (min kursivering)

Interventionerna utifrån har dock inte slutat än, visar det sig:

However, there is a tendency among important actors to neglect that [certain political Somali groups] were also part of an underground war taking place in Somalia after 9/11, when Ethiopians and the US paid certain factions to kill and kidnap religious figures – who were sometimes far less extremist than they were perceived – and Islamist militants.

- A Nation Without a State, s. 15-16

Bättre utan staten?
Likt Leesons artikel ger Värlsbanken några skäl för att tvivla att det blir bättre med en stat:

The Somali state had already failed to deliver public goods and services before the civil war, although its shell was still standing. Despite some auspicious early initiatives such as a massive campaign to improve adult literacy and the adoption of a Somali script, the Siad Barre government after 21 years in power had failed to develop public institutions capable of delivering public goods. During the 1980s, as the state was confronted with internal rebellions, an increasing share of its budget was devoted to administrative and military expenditures. As a result, social and development needs such as primary health care, education, and maintenance of transport infrastructure accounted for a very small proportion of recurrent public expenditure relative to the rest of Africa.

- From Resilience, s. 55

Government [in contrast to the private sector] is often a malevolent actor, in corrupt and autocratic countries as well as in countries like Somalia with weak or n o governance institutions, and thus regulation is often associated with worse market outcomes than unfettered private markets could achieve.

- From Resilience, s. 70

Överlag är rapporten dock inställd på att en stat är nödvändig för att lösa många problem; att en stat gjort många saker dåligt innebär inte att en ny stat, styrd med bättre ledning, måste upprepa dessa misstag. "Planering" är ledmotivet: planering för att lösa miljön, rättsystemet, nya regleringar, fred, utveckling och slutligen planeringen för att skapa en ny stat. Tron att en organisation kan planera detta och implementera en plan som kan tvingas på ett så stort antal indvider är nog för evigt dömt att misslyckas, som William Easterly har argumenterat för.

Jag måste dock säga att Countering Terrorism fått mig mer skeptisk till anarki, då den redogör för den tråkiga dynamiken som uppstår när en stat försvinner, och hur alla andra stater runt om i världen skyndar dit för att ställa allt till rätta. Det visar inte att anarkokapitalism inte är rätt eller ett ovärdigt mål, utan bara att det är tydligare hur mycket andra stater ogillar en sådan lösning.